Sammy Karon
15 February 2015
Before I begin this blog post, I have to admit
that I really struggled with both of these readings. To avoid making claims that
might be wrong, I am going to discuss the two main questions that both readings
left me thinking about. First, I am going to explore the ways both texts deal
with "mechanics” of identity, specifically where does identity come from?
Second, I am going to deal with the ethics of identity, how should we include
some people into our identity and exclude others?
The
first question is the foundation of both Cornell and Zerilli’s writing. Before
they can discuss the future of feminist politics, they must first establish the
origin of feminist identity. Cornell calls the process of establishing identity
“imagination,” which for women involves having the capacity to follow our
desires, “to chart out a life that is our own” (145). Cornell writes that the
feminist identity is a collective project, because women must first discover
their desires on their own, and then work together to achieve them in a
political manner (147). Zerilli, on the other hand, seems to struggle more with
defining the female identity. This is because she does not want to exclude
anyone who ought to be part of the conversation, but she’s also wary of
allowing people in who shouldn’t be part of the group. Cornell’s imagination
system seems like it would be an issue for Zerilli, because there is “no
neutral place” to judge feminist identity from, so creativity in the
establishment of might be identity dangerous (177).
This
brings up the issue of how to include people in your identity. Cornell writes
about how women are autonomous, so the more we act on our desires the freer we
become (145). However, she doesn’t define which desires should be considered
part of the feminist identity and which should not. Zerilli, on the other hand,
considers how democracy works by putting out “commonalities” and then “speaking
back” (172). Here I see a conflict between the two authors, Cornell seems to
support acting in order to understand, where Zerilli seems to support speaking
to understand. Are these two examples somehow complementary?
In
conclusion, I see many similarities between the two texts, but I struggle to
understand the extent of which the author’s agree. Specifically in regard to
forming identity and then taking political action based on shared identity, I am
left wondering what ethical guidelines are shared by both texts?
I appreciate your blog post .I, too, was in the same boat. These readings were very difficult to evaluate. I think that both of your questions are very pertinent within these texts (and even just within daily life) .Identity is an important factor in life - whether or not you choose to accept that fact or not. I frequently question myself - does identity remain an individual importance or a collective importance? I think it is rather interesting that Cornell places identity and imagination together. Technically, you have the right to mold your own identity. That is, if you choose to do so. For example, i have a friend who identifies herself as "butch" rather than as "female" or "woman". Some would say she still falls under the categorization of "female". Yet, with identity, people can deter from other identities. Would this be an example of Cornell's imagination system? I think the word "imagination" can cause difficulty. Imagination is most frequently referred to as something that is not present. Is identity present? Or is identity hidden?
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