New Forms of Revolt

Contrast two forms of revolt described in the article.

Hande Lara Sever

            Kristeva states that there is a new from of revolt and the new revoltés are experiencing that there is no answer to social, historic and political impasses without a radical inner experience. Through the human psyche, inner experience, she categorizes forms of revolt because she believes that the key for transformation lies in this radical inner experience. She argues that “old” revolts were consumed by nihilism which was about “the abandonment of retrospective questioning in favor of an outright rejection of the old, so that new dogmas can take place.” She states that the nihilist revolté betrays the meaning of revolt because she or he is satisfied by the stability of new values. Kristeva believes that the experience of true revolt, intimate revolt, and transformation is achieved by doing inner search. As a tool for inner search she uses psychoanalysis and dismisses the spiritualist options. She thinks that currently everyone experiences the syndrome of ideality because as adults we acquire the certainty that there is an absolute satisfaction. Kristeva states:

 “The belief that an ideal object exists( be it a partner, a profession, or a creation) is accompanied by the absolute belief that the parental couple, oidipous complex, must be suppressed and even abolished so that the adolescent subject can escape into an idealized, paradisiacal form of absolute satisfaction.”

She states that any disappointment in this ideality  syndrome ruins the paradise. Kristeva states that after the disappointment in this ideality a person becomes a nihilist “Because it exists(in the unconscious), yet “he” or “she” disappoints me(in reality). I have no choice but to be angry with them and seek revenge…” According to Kristeva this is the old revolté reaction which she later identifies as the “wake of maladies of reality”. So Kristeva thinks that for true transformation we should abandon the nihilist approach and aim to transform ourselves through psychoanalysis by overcoming the ideality syndrome.

Side Critique of the Ideality Syndrome and the “Suburban Trouble”

In her article Kristeva states

“… I would like to call the “suburban troubles” which are especially felt in Marseille but elsewhere as well. Aren’t they due to a failure of French model of secularism?... I think it is the delinquency of “disadvantaged teens” reveals more radical phase of nihilism. This delinquency concerns the deeper mechanisms of civilization and highlights the destruction of the pre religious need to believe that constitutes the psychical life with and for other, on which I sought to shed light today.”

I disagree with Kristeva on how and why these tensions are cultivated. I think these tensions are felt because of the history of colonialism not simply because of the failure of French model of secularism or clash of values as she states it.

To be more concise I think an Algerian French adolescent who lives in a banlieue of Marseille experiences something greater than just the disappointment in ideality since she or he enters society with a different baggage, the baggage of a massacre/genocide survivor. As “Paris forced itself on Algiers in 1830 with a quasi-genocide and left it in 1962 amid a shocking outburst of torture, terrorism, and ethnic cleansing that outdid the occasional massacres and unending discrimination of the long years of colonial occupation.”(World Affairs Journal, 2013) Until recent these war crimes were unacknowledged by the French government, if I am not mistaking the current president Françoise Hollande apologized for the 61 massacre in 2013 and became the first high-rank French official to acknowledge the tragedy. To keep it short I think an Algerian French revolté’s decision to revolt goes beyond the disappointment in ideality because he or she witnessed what Kristeva calls the “extreme evil” in her article. Thus what she calls “suburban troubles” are caused not just because of clash of Muslim values versus secular French values but because of colonial history. Thus I think an Algerian French citizen’s psyche is different from a French person. Since France is not a homogenous society I think her argument that people protest just because of disappointment in ideality is very reductive for the experience of a French citizen from a former colony as this person might never got the chance to construct that ideal in her or his psyche. If we apply it to a global spectrum the same falls for a black person protesting in Ferguson or a Kurdish citizen protesting for his rights in Turkey because both of the communities are un-acknowledged holocaust survivors who are still surviving despite every governmental structure that is against them. Thus their motivation to protest goes beyond disappointment in ideality, it is a protest for existence. Lastly, I think framing the reason behind these protests as clash of values and dismissing colonial history is very reductive.

Source: World Affairs Journal: http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/politics-apology-hollande-and-algeria

Butler and Dietz Response

Andrea Gamboa
22/2/15

In Butler and Dietz's respective articles, both of the authors discuss the ways in which current politics falls short of addressing feminist needs and goals. Though the authors do not call for a new kind of feminist politics, they do argue for a re-conception and reformation of past and present feminist politics.

Dietz argues that politics must be "resuscitated" in order to render feminism an integral component of democracy. In critiquing liberalism, Dietz argues that it serves to uphold traditionally masculine values and in turn, upholds patriarchal norms. Butler and Dietz both focus on the inclusion of all women in society, but they do so in different ways. Dietz uses the language of "universal citizenship" while Butler focuses on the fact that women are human and because they are human they are entitled to certain inalienable human rights. Butler argues that defining humanity and the human experience is crucial in this aspect because of the fact that so many groups are widely considered "sub-human." For example, many people misconstrue the phrase"Black Lives Matter" into "All Lives Matter" in an effort to prove that every life is of value. The reality within society today proves that this statement is far from the case and rather the exclusion and dehumanization of groups is often so insidious, it can go unrecognized.

As Butler puts it, "certain lives are not considered lives at all...and their dehumanization occurs first, at this level. This level then gives rise to physical violence that in some sense delivers the message of dehumanization which is already at work in the culture" (25). I personally found Butler's argument more compelling because she focused on the humanity aspect of feminist politics and not through something as easily re-definable as citizenship, but I am interested in learning what the class thought of the two readings.

Butler & Dietz on Feminist Politics

In both of their writings, it seems as though Dietz and Butler are not necessarily advocating for feminist politics or a new kind of feminist politics, but more so for the feminist movement to actually address the inequalities and lack of access for women in the political sphere.Both Dietz and Butler argue that women should look beyond institutional access through reason towards an inclusivity that overcomes the societal barriers of the old "equal access" method.
Dietz focuses on overcoming this barrier through advocating for universal citizenship, which would demand that the democratic principles, values, and rights are extended to women and the feminist movement. I think Dietz takes an interesting route in trying to address the feminist movement through politics because citizenship is defined by those who control the power and information source in the government. If citizenship can be so easily redefined by whoever happens to be in power, how is that the best path for women to actually gain rights and equality? It seems like something so easily redefined or overturned wouldn't carry enough weight or purpose to really change institutions.
Butler, on the other hand, focuses on the rights extended to any human. Butler also seems to be more in line with third wave feminism as she argues that each group, regardless of its size and difference from the main group, should be recognized and equal and distinct and be allowed to represent itself in politics. It seems like Butler's tact has a little bit more applicability and longevity, regardless of who is in power because she basis her argument on the natural rights owed to each human, not the rights owed to each citizen or owed under some man made law.

Butler and Dietz

Butler and Dietz both criticize labels in their own ways and ultimately call for a political challenging of labels in their own way. Dietz forms oppositions to viewing feminism and women as either entirely individualized or generalized.  This becomes clear as she debases both Marxist and Materialist Feminists on their ideals (and lack thereof) of citizenship. According to Dietz, "equal access" is not enough because the structure of access and that which access is given of is inherently limited, but rather citizenship should be the ultimate goal of the feminist. 

Dietz points out early on "an important truth: at each moment our lives, our every thought, value, and act--from the most mundane to the most lofty--takes its meaning and purpose from the wider political and social reality that constitutes and conditions us" (Dietz 1). Butler further develops this idea and takes it one step further, claiming that there isn't a separation between the self and society's norms: "I cannot know who I am without drawing upon the sociality of norms that preceded and exist within me" (Butler 32). Butler calls for all who are oppressed due to sexuality and gender to "assert an entitlement to the conditions of life" which are considered to be distinctly human and to "subject [their] very own categories [of humanity] to critical scrutiny" (Butler 37, 38).

While Dietz and Butler call for a focus of inclusion of women (and other groups) into new categories, their language (and approach) differ. Dietz calls for a more universal "citizenship", but Butler's focus on "humanity" relays this sense of citizenship in that all humans have certain natural rights. The language "humanity" gives insight to the social aspects of the feminist battle. Butler, also, practices the inclusion principles she teaches by discussing how one must continue to redefine what humanity is, and whose lives are valuable, as new social and political contexts arise. 

Dietz and Butler

Caleb Parsons

Feminism’s sphere of influence is vast, yet it appears from Judith Butler and Mary Dietz that feminism has a long way to go in achieving substantial gains. The shortfall feminism faces in Dietz’s view is its refusal to engage in the political process and the development of citizenship. Dietz means to understand the political being in context with the power relations that shaped it. By contrasting liberalism with two popular feminist critiques, those being Marxist feminism and maternalism, Dietz explores the different ways citizenship and democracy have been largely ignored in the contemporary political discussion. For Dietz, citizenship is crucial to re-evaluating the American political environment. It is through a critical analysis of citizenship that democracy in its preferred form will manifest itself in American politics. The role of feminism in this process is to guide the development of virtues, relations, and practices of democratic participation (13-14). Dietz unambiguously outlines a “feminist politics” as a means of ensuring a just extension of citizenship and democracy. In a less unambiguous political scheme, Butler establishes a politics of recognitions, wherein the bodies of those most vulnerable in society are affirmed and valued. While much of American society deems certain lives worth grieving and others not, Butler focuses her attention to the people devalued and dehumanized in the U.S. The human body for Butler has a wide range of relations and influences that impact the larger political body. While autonomy is certainly a desirable condition, Butler asserts that, as human subjects, we own very little of our physical selves. With this thought in tow, Butler elaborates that it must be the responsibility of politics to serve and protect those bodies that are vulnerable to systematic and institutionalized forms of violence. My question for Dietz’s work in particular focuses on the separation she wishes to draw between liberalism and her democratic conception. Is she not relying on a historically liberal practice when she advocates for an expansion of democracy? If she means to withdraw from the liberal-capitalist vision should she not devise a completely new language to approach political organization? 

Dietz and Butler

Butler’s article deals mainly with the democratic project in the representation sphere. As she states in page 20, “we have an interesting political predicament, since most of the time when we hear about rights, we understand them as pertaining to individuals, or when we argue for protection against discrimination, we argue as a group or class.” This view presents people as “bounded beings,” all of whom are “distinct recognizable, delineated, subjects before the law” and a “community defined by sameness.” Essentially, Butler calls all defenders of rights and the democratic ideal to fight against this categorical and systematic configuration that has dominated political culture for years. She calls for a restructuring of this system so that every group, no matter how small, represents itself within the political sphere, so that each culture and identity is unique, recognized, celebrated, and, most importantly, heard. Ideally, every group should have its own representation instead of submitting to the misconceived, though well intentioned, representation offered by majority and privileged groups. In many ways, Butler calls for feminist politics that align with several of our previous readings. She advocates for a system where women represent themselves and their groups. The white, privileged woman and the inability to “collapse the distinction between you and me” share the role of suppressor or oppressor, though not necessarily villain, in the framework. Dietz, by contrast, focuses on liberalism. She states that within liberalism’s concept of citizenship, the human is viewed as a “rational individual” who has “intrinsic worth”, is the “bearer of formal rights,” and that society has to ensure the freedom of all its members to realize their capabilities, with which comes human equality. This system allows equal membership to the economic and social markets, somewhat regulated by government and with “the assumption that market maketh the man.” As she describes, “what makes liberalism seem politically barren to so many of its critics,” is “the vision of the citizen as the bearer of rights, democracy as the capitalist market society, and politics and representative government.” She ties this into feminist politics when she states that liberalist feminism deals with “equal access talk.” Based on her descriptions, I assume she subscribes to the viewpoint that women deserve the same rights as men but, due to their innate difference as female, also deserve certain rights to aid them in their economic and social development. For example, a woman should not have to choose between a career and children, as men are not asked to do so, so they should not be asked if they plan on having children during interviews.  

Dietz and Butler

“to call for social transformations in the name of women, we must also be part of a critical democratic project.” Briefly describe the kind of politics that each of the authors (Dietz, writing in 1987, and Butler, writing in 2004) calls for.  In what ways, if at all, are they advocating for a “feminist politics” — or calling for a new kind of feminist politics?

Hande Lara Sever

In her article Undoing Gender Butler draws attention to how the notion of human is constructed. According to Butler, to encounter oppression requires one’s understanding of how lives are supported and maintained differentially. Certain lives are highly protected and they have sufficient power to “justify” their claims and to mobilize the forces of war. This can be exemplified by Colin Powell’s infamous speech at the UN headquarters where he stated that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction that ironically Iraq did not have and the war only resulted in millions of civilians’ death, displacement and rape. Butler states that “The notion of human is presupposed; the human is defined in advance, in terms that are distinctively Western, very often American, and, therefore, partial and parochial.” As a result of this notion certain lives are not considered as lives at all because they do not fit in the dominant frame of human. As a result, she states that international human rights must  question and re-define what is meant by human. As stated by Butler women have not been fully incorporated as human. Thus Butler defends that for international women’s rights we must not impose what is right for everyone but rather we should find a way to enter into communities and “discover what is right in the midsts of cultural translation.” So that feminists should accurately discuss and open up what is to be human which would provide a good basis for international women’s rights.

Dietz’s article agrees with Butler’s remarks stated through her article Undoing Gender. Dietz critiques liberalism in her article Context is All. According to Dietz, currently, in America, “democracy is tied to representative government and the right to vote rather than the idea of the collective, participatory activity of citizens in the public realm”, as a result it fails to ensure the freedom of all its members. Dietz quotes Mary Shanley to elaborate on the closure that feminists face by Liberalism “While liberal ideals have been efficacious in overturning restrictions on women as individuals, liberal theory does not provide the language or concept to help us understand the various kinds of human interdependence… nor to articulate a feminist vision of ‘good life’.” Dietz thinks the talk of equal access, locus of Liberal Feminism, is not enough since we are tied into a network of liberal concepts: rights, interests, contracts, individualism, representative government and negative liberty. As a result, when feminism is concentrated solely on equal access it faces a certain closure. She thinks that a collective system is needed for progress, not a majority system. She defines collective system as a place where concerns are undertaken by active engagement of citizens in public world. She argues that feminists do not concentrate enough on this issue because their agenda is predominantly occupied with equal access. “As long as feminists focus only on questions of social and economic concern- questions about children, family, schools, work, wages, pornography, abortion, abuse- they will not articulate a truly political vision, nor will they address the problem of citizenship.” So Dietz argues that feminists must transform their democratic practices into a more comprehensive theory of citizenship and show commitment to the activity of citizenship. She also thinks if feminists shift their focus to a more comprehensive theory of citizenship, then international feminism would be possible across democratic societies.

Butler and Dietz

On p. 37 of her text, Judith Butler writes, “to call for social transformations in the name of women, we must also be part of a critical democratic project.” Briefly describe the kind of politics that each of the authors (Dietz, writing in 1987, and Butler, writing in 2004) calls for.  In what ways, if at all, are they advocating for a “feminist politics” — or calling for a new kind of feminist politics?

Dietz choses to focus her discourse, mainly regarding liberalism, on citizenship rights. I have always found citizenship a controversial topic – around the world. There are a few countries with very strict nationality laws where either a person cannot gain citizenship (regardless of the years lived in that respective country) or can gain citizenship after a multitude of years living within the country. However, it is important to note that although someone gains citizenship or is born with citizenship, it does not guarantee accessibility to everything. Dietz explains that, “a second tenet of liberal political thought is that society should ensure the freedom of all its members to realize their capabilities”. Thus, one must have a source of accessibility to reach these personal capabilities. It is evident that, although women born or are of United States descent or have gained nationality, they are not provided with the same resources as that of men. Regardless if we look at educational attainment statistics (public) , employment statistics (public), second-shift labor statistics (private) or personal views statistics (private), we can witness this ongoing lack of accessibility. I think the idea of citizenship is a perfect example of how one can be recognized by a society as a “part” (“I am a French citizen or I am an Ecuadorian citizen”) but can be shielded from actually living to one’s ability within that society that they are “a part of”. Feminist politics has allowed for society to become aware of the disadvantages of being a “citizen” but not being treated as a “citizen”. Does citizenship have any important regarding our identity? I have a friend who was born in Connecticut and raised by parents from Mississippi. She knows that she has United States citizenship but she doesn't relate or feel compelled to tell others that she is from the states. I think citizenship is a very important topic that can bring about varying opinions. I think access is absolutely important. 

Feminist politics or just the awareness of females within politics would better the world. Females are humans. (something that is relevant in Butler's work).

That's why human rights - on one hand could be seemingly wonderful as we're addressing the rights of all humans however on the other hand, which human is granted MORE of the benefits?Who decides WHICH human right is the most important?