Mouffe

Mouffe's general argument centers on how to actualize democratic theory despite the innate inequalities built into the power structure and system. She thinks this can be overcome through a pluralistic lens by acknowledging that there are in fact differences and that it is okay to acknowledge those differences as long as it doesn't lead to exclusion. She recognizes that in practice, however, this is still difficult to achieve because the minorities (gender or race) are compared to the norm (male or whiteness), and that overcoming this idea of the norm/neutral is difficult because it is in fact very far from neutral. I think the issue she has with this idea of the norm is that is supposedly built upon rationality as a creator of equality like Rawl's theory argues; however, I think this approach fails to realize the fallacies built into that reasoning because there is little chance the current power group will not create justifications for their behavior. Pluralism is a place to begin in fixing this skewed view because it advocates for the existence of multiple different views at the same time without the infringement of either group. I wonder exactly how she thinks this would be able to be carried out given the current power group? I didn't really catch that in her theory discussion. 

Mouffe

In their article, Mouffe argues in favor of pluralism as a component of democracy because it allows differences between individuals to be viewed in a positive light and it "refuses the objective of unanimity and homogeneity which is...based on acts of exlcusion" (246). Mouffe acknowledges the extent to which pluralism can play a role in democratic politics by contrasting her definition of pluralism with one in which heterogeneity and incommensurability is emphasized (246). This contrast is crucial because the author acknowledges that certain differences are socially constructed based on how much (or little) an individual's identity and physicality is valued in society. By emphasizing these socially constructed differences through an idealistic democratic pluralism, a integral characteristic of pluralism-- antagonism.

In sharp contrast to Rawl's argument, Mouffe favors acknowledging the existence of the relations of power within a democratic society in order to transform them. Negating the "ineradicable character of antagonism and aim at a universal rational consensus" threatens democracy and enforces hegemony of the a certain social group because of the existing power relations (248). Differences are flattened to the point of "equality," which threatens the viability of certain social groups due to institutional practices by the ruling majority.

In this democratic ideal, those who are different from the hegemonic group in power are institutionally excluded under the pretense of "neutrality." I personally agree with this passage of Mouff's piece as I see many examples of this false neutrality manifesting itself as institutional biases and discrimination. The opposition to Affirmative Action typically argues that non-minorities are "discriminated against" because minorities are given the opportunities they deserve. As flawed as that argument may be, I think their opposition to Affirmative Action is rooted in the false equivalency that things like the college admissions process do not fall under the pretense of  being "neutral" and therefore favorable to whites. The fact that Affirmative Action is the antithesis of "neutral" is misconstrued by those with the most social capital in our democratic society to be discriminatory against them.

Mouffe

Caleb Parsons

In Chantal Mouffe's work, "Democracy, Power and the 'Political'" the challenges of organizing a pluralistic democracy remain a crucial matter. American political society derives a great deal of authority by making claims to universal values founded upon rationality. While these claims and values may make it easier to organize a larger populace, Mouffe recognizes that they also hide power relations and unequal distributions of political voice. What Mouffe calls on the reader to do is to critique calls to rationalism and essentialism in the public sphere. Mouffe is sure to draw distinctions between the ancient notions of democracy and the modern notions of democracy in their varied natures, rather than sizes. This nature is founded upon notions of plurality, which seeks to bring an end to any substantive claims to a good life. With this brings and end to certainty, and a more open definition of what constitutes citizenship and legitimate private space. The radical and plural democracy must take it upon itself to celebrate plurality, while simultaneously recognizing the power dimensions that form certain social groups in the first place. Mouffe disagrees with Rawl's call to a "rational" form of liberal democracy. Rawl's theory constructs an dangerously utopian idea of liberal democracy which would effectively suppress any dissent, thereby relating dissenting individuals as irrational. The radical and plural democracy Mouffe calls for the recognition and transformation of power structures, at the same time respecting the identities that have formed from them.

Mouffe

I think one of the most important components of Mouffe's article is that, we are incapable of freeing ourselves from power. As we have discussed previously, power is one of the fundamental sources of inequality among the sexes (and among varying races). I think it is important to analyze the definition of the word "democracy" or "democratic". The definition of democratic is "a system of government in which power is vested in the people, who rule either directly or through freely elected representatives." Who are the “people”? If there is a power dynamic within a democracy, then how do all "people" have the right to voice their opinion? Are women or people of color considered "people" within this composition? This takes us back to the notion of "humanness". Who is considered a "human" within our society? Males? Females? Anglo-Saxon males? How can a democracy materialize if "people" are excluded? Mouffe mentions that differences should be irrelevant and that "this is why the type of pluralism that I am advocating gives a positive status to differences and that it refuses the objective of unanimity and homogeneity which is always revealed as fictitious and based on acts of exclusion”. Acknowledging difference allows for us to acknowledge varying struggles. However, if we allow for all humans to be regarded as humans, would that be eliminating "difference"? Is it possible to eliminate differences?

On Democracy, Power and the Political

In general, address the question of how the author thinks about the challenges of difference (in terms of race, gender, etc.) to democratic theory and practice. 

Hande Lara Sever

In her article Democracy, Power and the Political Mouffe states that conflict and division should be accepted within a society and equal liberty for everyone should be ensured. She states that within a democratic society social objectivity is constituted through acts of power, hence to ensure equality for everyone we should concentrate not on “how to eliminate power but how to contitute forms of power that are compatible for democratic values.” Mouffe believes that we can not completely free ourselves from power and defends pluralist democracy. Before deconstructing what pluralist democracy is she critiques the ideology of John Rawls’ political liberalism and his approach to pluralism. Rawl concentrates on the question of “how to establish peaceful coexistence among individuals with different conceptions of the good.” Rawls’ main objective is creating a concensus on political fundamentals which defines “a core morality that specifies the terms under which people with different conceptions of the good can live together in political association.” Rawls thinks that this core morality should be established through “overlapping concensus”.  He also links reason to overlapping concensus as he states that reasonable people are those who accept to live according to this overlapping concensus. Mouffe is against this concensus as she thinks that “the distinction between ‘reasonable’ and ‘unreasonable’ helps to draw a frontier between those who accept the liberal principles and those who oppose them”.  As a result Mouffe thinks that Rawl’s ‘well ordered’ society is restrictive and problematic as it dismisses the oppostion to the ‘overlapping concensus’ as unreasonable and irrational. She says “Every pretension to occupy the place of universal(overlapping concensus for Rawls), to fix its final meaning through rationality must be rejected since the recognition of undecidability is the condition of existance of democratic politics.” Mouffe states that pluralism creates conflict and undecidability. According to Mouffe  this dynamic should be embraced rather than dismissing it for the sake of a well ordered society. “We have therefore to abandon the very idea of a complete reabsorption of alterity into oneness and harmony. It (plurality) is an alterity that can not be domesticated.”

As a result Mouffe argues that we should concentrate on freedom and pluralism for everyone rather than solely concentrating on the creation of a well ordered society. I found this article very interestig as Mouffe critiques the foundations of American society through Rawls’ argument according to her country’s own values. Belgium is a country whose politics are formed by Flaman versus Wallon tensions and Belgium recently survived a 20month governmental shut down which I think is good example for Mouffe’s approach to pluralism and acceptence of conflict and undecidability.

Iris Young's Communicative Democracy

Sammy Karon

15 March 2015

            In “Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy,” Iris Young argues that deliberative democracy fails to address the challenges of difference, and thus communicative democracy should be considered as a better model. Deliberative democracy focuses on bringing people together through shared experience and creating political power through social unity. By promoting unity, however, deliberative democracy automatically turns against difference. Although deliberative democracy assumes public discussion creates unity for all, the model fails to acknowledge the background factors that lead people to become political speakers. Young notes that in reality, not all citizens are equal speakers, yet deliberative democracy assumes unity already exists between people and thus excludes quieter voices by denying them opportunities to be heard. Politics cannot make people equal speakers because politics cannot change the differences unique to each human life, and by trying to eliminate cultural differences to create unity, deliberative democracy ultimately fails to generate universal political power.  

            To correct the flaws in the deliberative democracy model, Young proposes the communicative democracy model. While deliberative democracy aims to generate political power through unity, communicative democracy aims to generate political power through differences. In order to use difference as a tool for good, discussion must focus on how speakers are different, not how the are the same. Only people are able to successfully understand another speaker’s different perspective will the polity be considered powerful. Young notes that comfort and unity are ultimately harmful to people because they fail to encourage “self-transcendence,” or the recognition of one’s own role as a problem and solution in social issues. Through greeting, rhetoric and storytelling, Young argues people can learn to understand not only how people differ in perspective, but why those differences are significant and potentially positive sources of change. Thus, Young addresses the challenges of difference in democratic theory by suggesting that people should solve the problems of the many by using the voices of the many, rather than seeking to find the voice of the whole.

New Forms of Revolt

In Kristeva's piece, she contrasts two different forms of revolt with another: internal and external revolt. Arguing that each type of revolt holds a specific place within a certain historical context, Kristeva notes that internal and external forms of revolt are not two distinct kinds of revolt that were born individually, but rather one followed the other with the progression of time and the changing relationships between a state and its people. At first, Kristeva makes it seem as if modern revolt is different from revolt in the past, contrasting The French Revolution with university strikes seen today, but as her piece develops she argues that the new form of revolt has more to do with the "inner experience" as opposed to challenging external factors. The "inner experience" is "demanding, unique and able to appropriate the complexity of the past in order to approach the present and the future" (2). Contrary to previous popular form of external revolt, the new inner experience is necessary given our historical context because it both rejects the current system of values and policy and offers a "sensible alternative" in its place (2). This is not to take away from the contribution of external revolt in shaping our modern societies, however. Kristeva argues that this "new species" of rebels are just as furious with social, political, and economic injustice as rebels of the past, but they use this anger in order to drive their own internal motivations to revolt and mold their society.